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NORTH CAROLINA LAW REVIEW
Credit Transactions-Mortgages-Purchase by Life Tenant
In Morehead v. Harris,' a husband, joined by his wife, had
executed a deed of trust on two tracts of land as security for a loan.
The husband died intestate with the debt outstanding. At a fore-
closure sale pursuant to the terms of the deed of trust, the wife
purchased the property for an amount equal to the unpaid balance of
the loan plus the cost of foreclosure. She received a deed from the
trustee purporting to vest in her a fee simple title to the property,
which was worth considerably more than she had paid at the sale.
The wife sold one tract of the property and devised the remaining
tract to her sisters. Before her death, the children of her mortgagor-
husband had begun litigation to recover both tracts of land. In
granting a recovery to the children,' the North Carolina Supreme
Court held that the wife purchased the property to protect her dower
interest and, as a life tenant, she held the excess above her life estate
in one-third of the property as trustee for the remaindermen.3 By
dictum, the court stated that if the wife, as life tenant, had paid
more than her proportionate share, she would be a creditor of the
estate for that amount.4 The case gives rise to two issues that merit
discussion: can a life tenant ever purchase mortgaged property free
of trust and, when he cannot, how much of the purchase price can
be recovered from the remaindermen as the excess above the life
tenant's proportionate share?
262 N.C. 330, 137 S.E.2d 174 (1964). The case had come before the
court once before, but was remanded to the superior court because of an omis-
sion of necessary parties. Morehead v. Harris, 255 N.C. 130, 120 S.E.2d
425 (1961).
2 This statement should be qualified in that a recovery was granted to
the children as opposed to the wife, but as to the tract conveyed by the wife,
the court remanded for a new trial on the grounds that the purchasers of
the property may be in the position of bona fide purchasers for value and
that the children had done nothing to protect their title. 262 N.C. at 344,
137 S.E.2d at 187.
'The wife was also the administratrix of the husband's estate, and the
court said that she was acting in a fiduciary capacity. It was stated that
when the fiduciary purchased at his own sale, he was a "trustee for tile
benefit of the estate to prevent loss to the estate." Id. at 336, 137 S.E.2d
at 180. Even though the wife did not purchase at her own sale (since this
sale was conducted by the trustee and not the administratrix of the estate),
the rule was said to apply. However, this reasoning is not important since
the trust would have been implied even if the wife had not been the ad-
ministratrix.
'Id. at 336, 137 S.E.2d at 181.
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North Carolina seems to be within the majority rule5 that the
life tenant becomes a trustee for the remaindermen when he pur-
chases directly at the foreclosure sale.6 However, the court makes a
distinction where the life tenant purchases from a third party who
bought at the sale. In an earlier North Carolina case,7 a wife had
executed a deed of trust to secure a loan. After her death, her
husband, a life tenant by curtesy, allowed a foreclosure. 8 The land
was purchased by a stranger who, on the same day, transferred the
title to the husband for a consideration equal to the purchase price.
When the children of the wife sought to recover the property, the
court held that no trust was implied absent a jury finding of fraud
or that the stranger acted as agent for the husband. Therefore, the
husband received a valid fee simple title to the property.
In considering the rationale and policy in the cases imposing a
trust on the life tenant, there seems to be justification for different
results when the life tenant purchases directly at foreclosure and
when he purchases from a third person. It is clear that any person
claiming an interest in the property under the intestate mortgagor
may redeem the property until foreclosure, at which time the re-
' Bullock v. Peoples Bank, 351 Mo. 587, 602, 173 S.W.2d 753, 759 (1943) ;
Tindall v. Peterson, 71 Neb. 160, 98 N.W. 688 (1904); MaGee v. Carter,
31 Tenn. App. 141, 148-49, 212 S.W.2d 902, 906 (1948). In Tindall, the
wife of the mortgagor resigned as administratrix of his estate and purchased
the property at the foreclosure sale. Without calling it a trust, the court
held that she protected her life interest and the interest of the remaindermen.
'See Farabow v. Perry, 223 N.C. 21, 25 S.E.2d 173 (1943); Creech v.
Wilder, 212 N.C. 162, 193 S.E. 281 (1937).
1 Miller v. Marriner, 187 N.C. 449, 121 S.E. 770 (1924).
'Even though the life tenant holds the property as trustee for the re-
maindermen, there are times when the life tenant is justified in allowing
a foreclosure on the deed of trust which will terminate the rights of the
remaindermen in the property. It has been established in North Carolina
that the life tenant is only liable to pay the interest on the encumbrance for
the duration of the period in which the interest was due, and then only to
the extent of the amount of "rent or actual value" received from the property.
Therefore, the life tenant is not a trustee for the remaindermen in that he
has to pay the interest to prevent a foreclosure under any circumstances.
Id. at 455, 121 S.E.2d at 773. See also Williams v. Williams, 120 So. 2d
202 (Fla. 1960).
o In addition to the situation where the third party is acting as agent
for the life tenant or there is fraud, it has been stated that the implied trust
will also arise where there is an agreement between the life tenant and
the third party that the life tenant provide an opportunity for the remainder-
men to reimburse him and claim their interests. Clark v. Cantwell, 40 Tenn.
202 (1859).
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demption rights are cut off.10 It is also clear that the wife holds a
dower right in the equity of redemption, the interest remaining in
her mortgagor husband." Since the wife is entitled to redeem the
property before foreclosure, she is in an advantageous position to
protect her dower interest from outside purchasers ;12 in saving such
interest, she also protects the remaindermen from losing their rights
in the property."8 Therefore, if the wife does not redeem and is justi-
fied in allowing a foreclosure,' 4 the courts will not allow her to bid
in and purchase the property at a price below the fair value to the
detriment of others claiming from the husband's estate. 5 In other
words, she cannot obtain through a foreclosure purchase any estate in
the property greater than she would obtain through redemption, and
any attempt to do so will be barred by the court through imposition
of a trust.
Aside from the fact that the life tenant will not usually be able
to purchase at a price below the fair market value of the property
when he buys from a third party who took under the foreclosure
sale,'6 the main reason for allowing him to do so is that there is no
detriment to the remaindermen. As previously stated, any person
claiming under the intestate mortgagor has the power to redeem.' 7
If the life tenant is justified in allowing a foreclosure, the rights of
the remaindermen are cut off and there is no reason why the subse-
quent purchase by the former life tenant should be deemed to pro-
tect the interests of the remaindermen whose claims to the property
are lost through their own inaction.
Assuming that the dowress does purchase at a foreclosure sale
giving rise to an implied trust, or redeems the property in which
case the mortgagee is entitled to the full amount of the encum-
10 Brown v. Jennings, 188 N.C. 155, 124 S.E. 150 (1924); I SCRIBNER,
DowFa 461 (1867).
" Gay v. J. Exum & Co., 234 N.C. 378, 67 S.E.2d 290 (1951), 30 N.C.L.
Rxv. 310.
1" The heirs could also redeem at any time before foreclosure if they were
financially in a position to do so. See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
18 Brown v. Jennings, 188 N.C. 155, 124 S.E. 150 (1924).
1, See note 8 supra and accompanying text.
"For this basic proposition, see Tindall v. Peterson, 71 Neb. 160, 98
N.W. 688 (1904) ; Miller v. Marriner, 187 N.C. 449, 456, 121 S.E. 770, 774
(1924).
1" Of course, the person bidding in at the foreclosure sale may not always
be able to purchase the property for the amount of the encumbrance, but
this was the case in both Morehead and Miller v. Marriner, supra note 15.
" See note 10 supra and accompanying text.
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brance,'8 is she entitled to recover anything from the remainder-
men for protecting their interests? North Carolina is in accord
with the majority rule'9 that the wife is entitled to recover reim-
bursement from the remaindermen who wish to claim their interest
in the property." However, in using the language "if the life
tenant pays more than his proportionate share, he simply becomes a
creditor of the estate for that amount," 2 1 the court in Morehead
left two questions open: of whose estate is the life tenant a creditor
and what is the "proportionate share" of the life tenant that must
be determined to decide how much reimbursement he is entitled to?
In tracing the authority cited by the court, it is clear that the
life tenant paying the encumbrance redeems from the mortgagee
an interest in excess of the life estate and is subrogated to the rights
of the mortgagee against this interest.2 2 Moreover, the life tenant,
having paid an obligation of the mortgagor, is entitled to a claim
against his estate for the proportion of the amount paid by him
for the interest beyond the life estate.2
As to a determination of the "proportionate share" of the wife,
" McCabe v. Bellows and Another, 73 Mass. 148 (1856). However,
there are certain situations in which the wife does not have to pay the full
amount of the encumbrance in order to get her dower allotment in the prop-
erty. If the holder of the mortgage does not wish to enforce payment of the
principal, the wife may be allowed to continually contribute an amount to the
mortgagee which is sufficient to pay one-third of the yearly interest on the
amount due. Bell v. Mayor &c. of New York, 10 Paige 49 (N.Y. 1843).
Where the heirs of the deceased mortgagor have redeemed, the widow
must make contribution to them "in proportion to the value of her life estate
in one-third of the property" in order to redeem such life estate. Swaine v.
Perine, 5 Johns. Ch. R. 482 (N.Y. 1821).
" Murphy v. May, 243 Ala. 94, 8 So. 2d 442 (1942) ; In re Daily's Estate,
117 Mont. 194, 159 P.2d 327 (1945); 2 WASHBuRN, REAL PROPERTY § 1142
(6th ed. 1902). However, it should be noted that the remaindermen may
not be compelled to contribute because he may feel that it is in his best
interest not to have the property redeemed. Of course, the remainderman
cannot claim his interest free of the mortgage without contributing his
proportionate interest. I SCRIBNER, DowEa 461 (1867).
2 Farabow v. Perry, 223 N.C. 21, 25 S.E.2d 173 (1943); Creech v.
Wilder, 212 N.C. 162, 193 S.E. 281 (1937).
21262 N.C. at 336, 137 S.E.2d at 181.
"Whitney v. Salter, 36 Minn. 103, 30 N.W. 755 (1886); Keller v.
Fenske, 123 Wis. 435, 101 N.W. 378 (1904). It has also been held that
the wife of the mortgagor husband can redeem the property before the
death of the mortgagor husband since she has an interest, although inchoate,
in the equity of redemption and can recover reimbursement from the estate
because her position is analogous to that of a surety for her husband.
Fitcher v. Griffiths, 216 MAss. 174, 103 N.E. 471 (1913).
" Whitney v. Salter, supra note 22; Keller v. Fenske, supra note 22.
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however, the authority does not lead to a specific conclusion and
the North Carolina court has never decided the question. A review
of the case law from other jurisdictions reveals two different views
in determining the amount of reimbursement which the life tenant
is entitled to recover from the remaindermen exercising their rights
to the property. In an early Maine case,4 the wife's allotted dower
included an entire mortgaged tract giving her a life estate in the
whole mortgaged premises instead of just one-third of it. The court
stated that after payment of the encumbrance on the mortgaged
tract by the wife she would hold for her life, and at her death, the
remaindermen could claim their interests by paying the wife's estate
the full amount paid by her in extinguishing the debt." Such a
result raises two interesting points: the wife is not entitled to any
reimbursement during her life, and when reimbursement is made,
the wife's estate is not held responsible for the value of the use
of the land during her life since at the time of the reimbursement
the remaindermen get the entire property. On the other hand, the
New York court2" discussed the more usual case in which the wife's
dower was a life estate in one-third of the mortgaged premises.
Having paid the full amount of the encumbrance on the entire
property, it was decided that the wife was required to contribute
the present value of an annuity attributable to her life estate in
one-third of the property and could only recover the excess paid
from the remaindermen. The annuity for which the wife was re-
sponsible was determined by multiplying one-third of the yearly in-
terest on the sum unpaid at the death of the husband by the number
of years in the wife's life expectancy."' In contrast to the Maine
view, the New York view holds the wife, as between her and the
remaindermen, responsible for her proportional part.
In referring to a "proportionate share" in Morehead, the court
seems to indicate that proportionate contribution would be required
from the life tenant, thus following the New York view; it is pos-
sible that the New York court's method of determining the pro-
portion to be paid by the dowress and the remaindermen would also
be followed. If no interest were due on the loan to the mortgagor,
" Wilkins v. French, 20 Me. 111 (1841).
"Id. at 119.
"House v. House, 10 Paige 158 (N.Y. 1843).
Id. at 165. Accord, Tindall v. Peterson, 71 Neb. 160, 98 N.W. 688
(1904).
[Vol. 43
NOTES AND COMMENTS
as appears to be the case in Morehead, there may be nothing upon
which to base the wife's proportionate share under the annuity prin-
ciple. However, under such circumstances, it seems that the wife's
proportion of the mortgage obligation could be derived by using
the proportion that the cost of an annuity,2 8 equal to the value of
the use of one-third of the property for the period of the wife's life
expectancy, bears to the whole value of the property.
Even with the abolition of dower under the present intestate
law,29 it is still possible for the Morehead situation to arise. Under
the election provision,80 if the widow of an intestate chose to become
a life tenant in one-third of the mortgagor-husband's estate, the same
problem of proportionate payment would arise. Absent an elec-
tion, when the husband dies intestate the widow now receives a por-
tion of his property in full fee, her share depending on the number
of children surviving him.8" Of course, her portion of the property
would be subject to the mortgage; in order to free the property from
debt, she may still be required to pay the full amount of the encum-
brance.32 In doing so, the wife would also be paying the debt on
the portion going to the other heirs of the intestate, and she would
be able to hold the property as security until she was reimbursed.
88
If the other heirs decided to exercise their rights to their portion
of the property, she would then be able to recover from them the
amount of the debt attributable to such portion plus interest. There
would be no problem of evaluating the proportion which should be
paid by the holder of a life estate.
Roy H. MICHAUX, JR.
'8 For a determination of one's life expectancy, see the mortuary table in
N.C. GEN. STAT. § 8-46 (Supp. 1963). To calculate the present value of
an annuity based on one's life expectancy under the mortuary table, see N.C.
GEN. STAT. § 8-47 (Supp. 1963).
"' N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-4 (Supp. 1963).
"o N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-30 (Supp. 1963).
"
1N.C. GEN. STAT. § 29-14 (Supp. 1963).
" See note 17 supra and accompanying text.
"II JONES, MORTGAGES § 1364 (8th ed. 1928); 2 WASHBURN, REAL
PROPERTY § 1142 (6th ed. 1902).
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